Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 94

Issue 3

Article 4

2006

Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and
Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation
Geoffrey C. Rapp
University of Toledo

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Law and Economics Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Rapp, Geoffrey C. (2006) "Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the Legal and Economic Aspects of
Post-Disaster Price Regulation," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 94: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol94/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Gouging:
Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the
Legal and Economic Aspects of
Post-Disaster Price Regulation
Geoffrey C. Rapp'

Traditionallaw andeconomicsallows no placeforpricecontrols. Yetpublic support
for anti-gouginglegislation has led to the enactment of a variety of legal regimes to
controlprice hikes following naturaland man-made disasters such as hurricanes
andterroristattacks. This Articleprovides an economicjustificationfor such laws.
First, the Article surveys the existing models of anti-gouginglegislation. Then, it
describes the traditionaleconomic critique ofprice caps, a critiqueapplied to antigouging laws. Finally, the Article argues that anti-gouginglaws enhance economic
effiaency by ensuringa functioning consumer market after the collapse of electronic
payment systems on which the American economy now depends. The externalities of
consumption inpost-disasterenvironmentsmean thatthe costs ofconsumersforgoing
needed products are not adequately capturedby a reliance on market mechanisms.
In addition,anti-gouginglaws may offset market inefficienciescausedby the decision
making heuristicsof suppliers. This analysissuggests that currentanti-gouginglaws
shouldbe restructuredto include a more discretefocus on areasactually affected by
physicaldamagefrom naturalorman-made disasters.

L

and economics loathes price controls. From rent controls for residential apartments in New York City2 to caps on wholesale oil prices
in Hawaii, 3 price controls have received harsh criticism from economicsminded commentators. 4 Certainly, price controls have objectionable conAW

i Assistant Professor, University of Toledo College of Law; Coordinator, Certificate
Program in Homeland Security Law; A.B. (Economics), Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law
School. Thanks to Bill Richman, Distinguished University Professor at the University of
Toledo College of Law, John Tehranian, Associate Professor at the University of Utah S.J.
Quinney School of Law, and Shannon Selden for their comments and suggestions on drafts of
this Article. Also, thanks to Lois Patek for her tireless administrative assistance.
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Rent Controlandthe Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 741 (1988).
3 Jim Lindgren, Wholesale Gas Caps: An Economic Experiment in Hawaii,ThE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACy, Aug. 28, 2005, http:l/volokh.comlarchives/ archive_2005_o828-2005o9
03.shtml.
4 See, e.g., John R. Lott Jr. & Sonya D. Jones, Politiciansin Need of Economics sot; Raising
Prices at Gas Pumps Before a FuelShortageMeans We'll Pay Less Overall,a Notion Lost on Officials
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sequences. For example, they lead to shortages, rationing, and inefficiency.
Under price controls, fewer goods and services are available, and they are
allocated to those lucky enough to be first in line rather than those who
need them most.5 To law and economics scholars, "gouging" is just a harsh
way of saying "market equilibrium." Producers who raise prices to the level
consumers are willing to pay are simply performing as Adam Smith's invis6
ible hand would direct.
Yet the public resents gouging7 as much as law and economics scholars
loathe price controls." When gas prices soared in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina's tragic landfall near New Orleans, President Bush made an appearance on "Good Morning America" and equated gasoline price-gougers with
looters.9 Gas prices did soar across the country, reaching $6.oo per gallon in
some locations. ° Public outrage soared as well." For members of Congress,
Outragedby 'Price Gouging,' NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 2005, at A33.
5 See infra Section II.
6 See Walter E. Williams, The Role of Prices, ThE WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, available at
http://washingtontimes.coml commentary/20050915-090251-9667r.htm.
7 It is by no means clear, however, that there is a generally agreed upon definition of
"gouging," even among its critics. Gouging obviously involves some element of a high, or
increased price, and some element of coercion, immorality, or opportunism on the part of a
product's or service's seller.
8 Allegations of gouging after natural disasters are widely reported in the media, even
well beyond the affected areas. See Gary E. Lehman, Price Gouging: Application of Florida's
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act in the Aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, 17 NOVA L. REV.
1029, 1032 (1993). Consumer outrage is particularly strong with respect to gouging relating
to certain core commodities like gasoline. See Cary A. Deck & Bart J.Wilson, Economics at the
Pump: Does "Anti-Price Gouging" Legislation Really Help Gasoline Consumers?, REG., Spring 2004,
at 22 ("The intensity of this backlash from spikes in gasoline prices is remarkable given that
many commonly consumed products can change in price radically in ashort period of time.").
For articles describing previous episodes of post-hurricane price gouging, see Timothy L.
Collins, "Fair Rents" or "Forced Subsidies" Under Rent Regulation: Finding a Regulatory Taking
Where Legal Fictions Collide, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1293, 1315 n. 130 (2003).
9 See Holly Manges Jones, President Bush: "Zero Tolerancefor Katrina Lawbreakers, JURIST,
Sept. I, 2005, available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/20ooS/9/president-bush-zerotolerance-for.php. The President warned: "I think there ought to be zero tolerance of people
breaking the law during an emergency such as this, whether it be looting, or price-gouging at
the gasoline pump...." Id. The President did not explain how price-gouging would violate
the law. His analogy is also not original. In the aftermath of Florida's 1992 experience with
Hurricane Andrew, state Attorney General Bob Butterworth opined, "I don't see any difference between the looters, who go through the rubble in the trailer parks, and the business
people who cash in on this disaster by gouging customers. I can't give you a good definition of
the difference between a looter and a price gouger, except that the price gouger may wear a
suit and tie." See Lehman, supra note 8, at 1033.
1o B.J. Reyes, Gas Prices Rise Slowly on Initial Day of Cap: Supporters Say the Law Shielded
Hawaii From the Effects of Katrina, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN NEws, Sept. 2, 20o5, available at
http://starbuiletin.com/20o5/o9/o2/news/story3.html.
II See Lott & Jones, supra note 4,at A33 ("With oil prices reaching $70 per barrel and
hotels outside of the Katrina disaster area raising rates, 'price gouging' seems to be politicians'
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skyrocketing gas prices provided an irresistible target for election-year indignation. In a Washington Post poll, seventy-two percent of respondents
felt that oil companies were gouging, and eight in ten faulted the federal
government's response to the oil companies' tactics.2 According to the Associated Press, 5,ooo angry consumers contacted the Energy Department's
hotline to complain of gas price gouging.' 3 Gouging allegations also surfaced in the wake of major terrorist strikes. When gas station owners in
Michigan raised prices in the hours after the September i i attacks on New
York and Washington (in some cases to nearly double their pre-attack levels),' 4 then-Attorney General Jennifer Granholm immediately listed fifty
offending stations, demanded apologies and refunds for customers, and
state's Consumer Protecordered the payment of fines for violations of the
6
tion law.' 5 Nearly all listed stations complied.'
Public angst with gouging (however defined) has led to legal actions
to prevent post-crisis price gouging. '7 Federal antitrust laws are the first
line of defense. The Sherman Act bars collaborative price gouging by forbidding horizontal "price fixing;"the Robinson-Patman Act bars price discrimination that might tend to reduce competition. Most scholars would
acknowledge that such laws actually promote economic efficiency (even in
post-disaster environments) by minimizing the deadweight loss of monopolistic conduct.'8 But a more recent phenomenon is the widespread adop-

favorite phrase these days."); see also John Stossel, In Praise of Price Gouging, TOWNHALL.
Sept. 7, 2005, http://townhall.com/opinion/columns/JohnStossel/2oo5/o9/o/155361.
html ("Politicians and the media are furious about price increases in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina.").
1 2 Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, PollSharplyDivided Over Bush, Pirr. POsT-GAZETrE,
Sept. 4, 2oo5, at AI3.
13 Associated Press, Thousands Complain to Feds on Gas Gouging: Lawmakers Demandan
Investigation, MSNBC, Sept. 2, 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9170150/.
14 See Dawson Bell, PetroleumPanic:Gas Station Ownerto Defend Prices in Court, DETRoIT
FREE PRESS, March I I, 2002, at IA.
15 See id.
16 Id. Michigan's law bars "grossly excessive" prices but does not specify what that term
means. As a result, formal price gouging charges are rare and rarely proceed beyond allegation
and settlement. One station owner, Bobbie Jean Harvey, refused to admit wrongdoing and
forced the state to take her to court. Id. Although I was unable to determine the outcome
of her case, she has become a bit of a cause celebre for Libertarians. See Rob Moody, A
September ii Profiteer,MISES INST., July 24, 2002, http://www.mises.org/fullstory.aspx?controlIOO9&id=74.
17 An advocacy group called "Citizens Against Gasoline Price Gouging" helped bring
about a wholesale gasoline price cap in Hawaii. See Reyes, supra note lo. That new law
requires the Public Utilities Commission for the state to set a maximum wholesale price each
week based on weekday average of spot prices in certain mainland markets. Id.
i8 See, e.g., Raymond A. Atkins, An Economic Model of Tying: Obtaining a FirstMover
Advantage, 5 GEo. MASON L. REV. 525 0997).
cOM,
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tion of state consumer protection laws designed to prevent price gouging
after natural or man-made disasters.
Such statutes take several forms. Some impose explicit percentage limitations on post-disaster price hikes.'9 Others bar "unconscionable" price
hikes, with varying definitions of unconscionability tied to pre-market prices, post-disaster costs, or the prices of comparable products. 20 Some bar any
increase whatsoever above pre-disaster levels.21
Mainstream law and economics scholars would undoubtedly object to
such regulations for the same reasons they find price controls generally unwarranted. 22 In response, supporters of disaster-relief anti-gouging statutes
could point to moral or distributional concerns. 23 Disasters may allow sellers to raise prices and extract a higher level of "surplus" from consumers.
Fairness proponents might object to the redistribution of surplus from buyers to sellers that follows disasters. The problem with the fairness defense
of anti-gouging laws is that it is too hard to reconcile a fairness defense
with an economic critique. Because the two views express themselves in
terms of two completely different goals, using two completely different vocabularies, the supporters and opponents of anti-gouging laws have no way
of reaching a shared understanding of the worth of such laws.
This Article presents an alternative way of thinking about the economics of anti-gouging laws. Natural disasters-such as Hurricanes Andrew
and Katrina-and massive terrorist assaults-like the 9/1I attacks on New
York City-have the potential to cause mass market failures in this era of
electronic consumerism. Price gouging may be fine so long as consumers
can access their financial assets or credit markets to pay according to their
reservation price. But where payment mechanisms have broken down and
uncertainty prevents the development of alternative measures, anti-gouging laws may actually be necessary to facilitate a minimum level of com-

19 See infra Section I.C.i.
20 See infra Section I.C.z.
21 See infra Section I.C.3.
22 In addition to the economic objections to post-disaster anti-gouging laws, such laws
may raise both constitutional concerns and pose implementation problems. First, any law
premised on identification of "emergency conditions" presents the challenge to decisionmakers
of distinguishing between emergency and normalcy. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?,112 YALE L.J. ilol, 1o69-72 (2003); John J.
Copelan & Steven A. Lamb, DisasterLaw andHurricaneAndrew-GovernmentLawyers Leading
the Way to Recovery, 27 URB. LAw. 29, 35-36 (i995) ("The prerequisites for the declaration of
both an emergency and a major disaster are very similar. In either case, the governor of the
affected state must make a determination that the situation is of such severity and magnitude
that the state is unable to respond effectively without federal assistance.").
23 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1510-13 (1998) (expressing doubt about the
efficiency case for anti-gouging laws and suggesting such laws serve distributional or fairness
goals).
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merce. Because post-disaster commercial transactions often help reduce
the negative externalities that natural disasters and terrorist attacks might
produce, the result of facilitating a minimal level of commerce may actually
be more optimal than what a free market would yield.
This analysis reveals, however, the efficiency limits of anti-gouging
laws. Only where the payment systems supporting consumer markets have
collapsed is the enforcement of such laws appropriate. Non-coordinated
price hikes in areas unaffected by the actual physical impact or secondary consequences of disasters should be permitted without government
interference. Because existing state anti-gouging laws do not distinguish
adequately between affected and unaffected areas, legislative reform is
required.
Moreover, anti-gouging laws may make sense where markets price inefficiently. To the extent that a product is affected by an "availability" or "anchoring" heuristic, the result of a supply-or demand-shock may be an
increase in price beyond the market optimum. Price increases may become
"sticky." If such heuristics are widespread, it may take too much time for
a market to correct naturally. Anti-gouging laws, by preventing rapid price
hikes, help avoid this problem of asymmetric market correction.
Section I describes the available legal remedies to prevent post-disaster
gouging. Section II describes the traditional law and economics objections
to such regulations. Section III outlines this Article's economic defense of
post-disaster price regulation.

I.

ANTI-GoUGING LEGAL REGIMES

A. Antitrust
Antitrust laws are the first line of defense against gouging in post-disaster
environments. Suppliers are frequently accused of "'price gouging,' exercising market power, or engaging in collusion. '' 24
To the extent that such accusations hold water, antitrust law applies.
Horizontal price fixing-that is, agreement by competitors to raise prices-is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.25 Violations may lead to fines
up to $ IOO,OOO,OOO if the perpetrator is a corporation, $i,ooo,ooo if the perpetrator is an individual, or a criminal sentence of up to ten years.26 To find
a violation, a court must find an agreement respecting price that restrains

24 Deck & Wilson, supra note 8, at 23.
25 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 146-92 (3d ed. 2005).
26 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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trade. 27 In addition to the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act bars discrimination "in price between different purchasers of commodities of like
grade and quality... where the effect... may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.... ,"sPotentially, price gouging could
violate this act if one set of consumers (say, those in a disaster zone) were
charged a different price than another (say, those outside of the disaster
zone) and the effect of that discriminationwas to lessen competition.
Despite its power to prevent cooperative price increases following natural or man-made disasters, antitrust law likely plays a limited role in these
settings. Concerted activity rarely seems to be the source of post-disaster
price spikes in "hot button" commodities like gasoline.29 Because price
shocks more often result from supply interruptions,3 ° horizontal price fixing
and collusion cases are difficult to prove. Moreover, the Robinson-Patman
Act has fallen out of favor; the Department of Justice has not enforced the
Act since 1977 and the FTC "largely ignores it as well."' 3 In a post-disaster
context, proving that price discrimination would lessen competition rather
than increase it would be exceptionally difficult.32 In addition, in times of
crisis, antitrust laws are often stretched or relaxed, 33 making them a less
powerful weapon in fighting "gouging" than it first appears.
The weakness of antitrust as a remedy for post-disaster gouging was
demonstrated in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. On May 22, 2006, the
27 See id.
28 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000).
29 See Deck & Wilson, supra note 8, at 23 (noting that the spring 2000 price spike in the
Midwest has been attributed to supply interruptions rather than collusion); see also Lott &
Jones, supra note 4, at A33 ("The American oil industry was no more concentrated when prices
started rising immediately before Hurricane Katrina hit than it was two weeks earlier, and oil
companies possess no sudden increase in monopoly power.").
30 See Deck & Wilson, supra note 8, at 23.
31 HOVENKAMP, supranote 26, at 579.
32 For the "morass" of problems facing a Robinson-Patman claim, see id. at 582-89.
33 See Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust in Wartime, 16 ANTITRUST 71
(2002). Several major antitrust cases were suspended during World War I to avoid destabilizing the economy further; those cases, however, did not deal with price gouging resulting from
wartime insecurity. Id. at 72. Steuer and Barile explain:
Whether to bend, or even to suspend, the antitrust laws in a time of
crisis is no easy question, but America's experiences in the First and
Second World Wars... provide instructive precedents. Both World Wars
were preceded by periods of vigorous antitrust enforcement. Both times
antitrust policy accommodated wartime priorities as necessary,while enforcement was maintained to combat conduct that threatened the economy. The lessons that emerge are that, first, antitrust will not stand in
the way of a war effort if it is applied with suitable flexibility; second, if
it becomes necessary to suspend antitrust enforcement to some degree,
such enforcement can be successfully reinstated at war's end; and, third,
war should not and need not excuse opportunism.
Id. at 71.
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Federal Trade Commission released a report, Investigation of Gasoline Price
Manipulation and Post-KatrinaGasoline Price Increases, in response to two
legislative mandates. 34 That report concluded that petroleum "companies
have not restricted the level of capacity below competitive levels and
35
that they have used their capacity to the fullest practical extent."
Anticompetitive conduct was not to blame for post-Katrina price hikes, and
therefore antitrust law does not offer a solution.
B. ContractLaw
Contract law also plays a potential role. The duty of good faith and fair
dealing restrains one party from using economic duress to force modification of a previous contract. 36 Similarly, the common-law doctrine of"unconscionability" prevents a court from enforcing the terms of a contract if such
terms are particularly objectionable.
These doctrines could play a role in a post-disaster environment, but
that role is likely to be limited. 37To begin with, consumers of products have
little to gain from individual litigation against sellers. Each "unconscionable" or "bad faith" contract was probably paid for at the time of the transaction, and consumers would have to endure a lengthy litigation process to
recover their individual relief, which would amount to only a few dollars
even if a court were to "unwind" the contract. Class actions are unlikely
to overcome these incentive problems because the differences between/
among consumers likely exceed their similarities.
C. Anti-Gouging Laws
Concerned that unilateral action to raise prices following disasters and
emergencies would be unassailable under antitrust statutes or the common
law, a number of states enacted anti-gouging legislation. More than half of
the states now have some form of anti-gouging law.35 At least nineteen of
39
those are laws that prohibit price gouging in the aftermath of disasters.
34 See Federal Trade Commission, Investigation of Gasoline Price Manipulation and
Post-Katrina Gasoline Price Increases, Spring zoo6, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
o605 i8PublicGasolinePriceslnvestigationReportFinal.pdf.
35 Id. at 4.
36 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.25 (3d ed. 2004).
37 Consumers with an existing contractual arrangement whose contract partners seek renegotiation would likely be able to stop such efforts under the common law doctrine of duress.
Such relationships are unlikely to be the major issue in post-disaster environments.
38 Mike Sunnucks, AG: State Has No Tools to Slow Skyrocketing Gas Prices, ThE BUSINESS
JOURNAL OF PHOENIX, Sept. 2, 2oo5, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/
stories/zoo51 o8/29/daily6l.html.
39 David Nitkin, Sticker-Shocked Maryland Drivers Voice Suspicions of Price Gouging, BALT.
SUN, Sept. I, 2005, at izA.
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The remaining laws are general consumer protection provisions rather than
laws that apply specifically to post-disaster economic disruptions. A number of states rarely affected by natural disasters, however, have no antigouging laws.40 Some states have sought to use executive orders to stop
gouging where they lack other legislative authorization.4
Many anti-gouging laws were enacted after particular disasters: Virginia
passed its "Post-Disaster Anti-Price Gouging"42 law in 2004 following severe damage in 2003 resulting from Hurricane Isabel;43 Florida passed its
anti-gouging law 44 in 1992 in the aftermath of the destruction caused by
Hurricane Andrew; 45 Arkansas' "unusually popular" Act 37646 passed by a
vote of 88 to I in 199747 after a series of devastating tornadoes struck the
state;4s California's law 49 was enacted in the wake of reported price gouging
40 See id. ("Like many states not often hit by natural disaster, Maryland has no emergency price-protection law. Earlier this year, Attorney General J. Joseph Curran Jr. proposed a
bill to limit price increases on 'essential goods and services' during emergencies declared by
the governor or president, but a General Assembly committee unanimously rejected it after
lobbying by gas distributors and retailers."); see also Sunnucks, supranote 38 ("Arizona has no
price gouging law....").
41 Prior to the passage of its anti-gouging law, Florida used an executive order to try to
contain post-disaster price increases. In the wake of Hurricane Andrew on August 23, 1992,
Florida Governor Lawton Chiles "issued Executive Order 92-222-E making the imposition or
demand of an exorbitant or excessive price by any vendor of fuels, foods, medicines or other
necessities a violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act." Lehman, supra
note 8, at 1030. Similarly, County Commissioners in affected counties (Dade and Broward)
passed emergency ordinances making price gouging an unlawful and unfair business practice
(ordinances set to expire one to two months after Hurricane Andrew). Id. The executive order
did not define the meaning of "exorbitant or excessive price," although county ordinances
defined it as "any cost greater than the price for similar goods, services or materials that was
imposed or demanded prior to August 24, 1992." Id. at 1031.
Florida's Executive Order therefore permitted the state to sue for injunctive relief, actual
damages on behalf of affected consumers, and fines of up to $io,ooo for each violation. Private
damages actions would also be available. Id.
In the wake of Hurricane Andrew, i,5oo consumer complaints were filed with the state.
Id. at I037. The state issued fewer than seventy-five subpoenas; "[a]bout one third of the
cases in which subpoenas had been issued have been settled with no further action taken."
Id.Therefore, very few cases proceeded to the litigation stage.
42 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-525 (Supp. 2005).

43 Walter E. Williams, PriceGouging,TOWNHALL.COM, Mar. 24, 2004, http://townhall.com/
columnists/walterwilliams/ww20040324.shtml.
44 FLA.STAT. ANN. § 501.160 (West 2ooz & Supp. zoo5).
45 David J. Federbush, Business Law: The Unclear Scope of Unconscionability in FDUTPA,
FLA. B.J., July/August 2000, at 49,51 n.24.
46 CodifiedatARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-88-301 to -305 (2001 & Supp. 2005).
47 Gina Cothern, Melissa C. Krebs, & Robin Neil Rhodes, Survey ofLegislation:Business
Law, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 377, 384 n.I 12 (1998).
48 Id. at 384.
49 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7123.5 (West 1995); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1689.5-1689.7,
1689.1o-1689.12, 1689.14 (West 1985 & Supp. 2oo5); CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (West 1999 &
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following the 1994 Northridge earthquake;50 Georgia adopted its law s' after
its Governor's Office of Consumer Affairs received fifty-seven complaints
of gouging following tornadoes and flooding in 1994.52
This section outlines the various models of state disaster-specific antigouging laws. I will not consider every provision of every law; rather, I
simply attempt to describe the various alternative anti-gouging laws that
states have pursued.
There are three primary models of anti-gouging law. The first is a "percentage increase cap" model, in which post-disaster price increases are limited to a specific percentage over pre-disaster prices. The second category
of laws bars "unconscionable" price increases with varying definitions of
unconscionability. The third category of laws bars any increase at all.
i. Percentageprice caps.-One form of anti-gouging statute bars price hikes
in the wake of a declaration of an emergency that exceed a certain percentage point increase over the pre-emergency price level. The Arkansas
and California statutes are the primary representatives of this category of
anti-gouging law. Arkansas' statute appears to have been modeled on California's law.53
Both laws prohibit merchants, upon proclamation of a state of emergency, from selling consumer food items, goods, or services for a price more
than ten percent above the price charged prior to the proclamation of the
emergency. 54 The prohibitions apply for thirty days after the declaration of
a state of emergency,55 but exceptions will be granted for merchants who
can show specific increases in their own costs. s6 Emergencies include natural or man-made disasters, such as floods, fires, earthquakes, and riots5 7The
covered products and services include building materials, emergency and
medical supplies, and human/animal food and drink s8 The laws prohibit
contractors from charging more than ten percent of their pre-declaration
prices for repair or reconstruction services for 18o days following the dec-

Supp. 2oo6).
50 Sean P Lafferty, Consumer Protection;Emergencies-ProtectionAgainst Price Gouging, 26
PAc. L.J. 215, 217 (1995).
51 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-393.4 to -397 (zooo & Supp. 2005).
52 John A. Creasy, Jr., Selling and Other Trade Practices, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 31, 32 (1995).
53 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-303 (zoo & Supp. 2005) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 396
(West 1999 & Supp. 2oo6).
54 § 4-88-303(a)(1); § 396(b).
55 Id.
56 § 4-88-303(a)(2), (b)(2); § 396(b)-(c).
57 § 4-88-303(b)(1); § 396(h)(i).

58 § 4-88-303(a)( i); § 396(b), (h).
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laration of a state of emergency.5 9 They also make violations punishable as
misdemeanors. °
California's law has been criticized on the grounds that it may be impractical, difficult to enforce, and applicable only to retail providers rather
than wholesale suppliers. 6' In addition, both laws present apparent loopholes to the extent that businesses are able to raise their prices after a disaster or terrorist attack but before the formal "proclamation" of an emergency.
Since the law only applies to post-proclamation price hikes, businesses can
avoid liability by hiking prices prior to an impending disaster (if there is
sufficient warning) or immediately after a disaster, so long as they beat the
proclamation. This creates both opportunities for evading the law and perverse incentives for suppliers. Suppliers who fear being locked into preproclamation prices may raise prices prematurely, before market conditions
justify it, and thus lose business.
Unconscionability Laws.-i. Structure of Laws.-Several states, including Massachusetts, Virginia, Florida, Indiana, and South Carolina, attack
gouging by barring the sale of goods at "unconscionably high prices ' 62 or
"grossly excessive prices" 63 after emergencies. The degree to which such
laws define unconscionability, or specify limits to the range of products
covered, varies.
Some of the laws apply only to specific products. Massachusetts' and
Indiana's laws focus solely on petroleum, making gasoline price gouging
"during any market emergency 64 an unfair or deceptive act and barring
"charging an unconscionable amount for the sale of fuel." 65 The laws of
2.

59 § 4-88-303(b)( i); § 396(c).
6o § 4-88-3o4(b); § 396(f).
61 See Lafferty, supra note 5o , at 217-18.
6z 940 MAss. CODE REGs. 3.18 (2005).
63 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-r(i) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. zoo5). The statute further
defines the relevant adverse market conditions triggering the act as "weather, convulsion of
nature, failure or shortage of electric power or other source of energy, strike, civil disorder, war,
military action, national or local emergency, or other cause of an abnormal disruption of the
market which results in the declaration of a state of emergency by the governor." § 369-r(2).
64 940 MAss. CODE REGS. 3.18.

65

INO. CODE ANN. § 4-6--9.1-2 (West 2005).

2005-2oo61

GOUGING

New York,6 Virginia,6 7and Florida,' however, apply to "essential consumer
goods."
In addition, there are various definitions of unconscionability. A number
of state laws (including Massachusetts, Indiana, and New York) focus on
whether there is a "gross disparity" between the offered price and the price
charged by the seller "immediately prior to the onset of the market emergency." 69 Some laws may also, or instead, compare the post-disaster price to
the average price at which the product was "readily obtainable" prior to the
disaster.7° Some also bar prices grossly above those at which the "product
is readily obtainable by other buyers in the trade area."' 7 New York law
defines an "unconscionably excessive price" as one at which the "excess in
price is unconscionably extreme" or one at which "there was an exercise
of unfair leverage or unconscionable means. '' 72Alabama's hybrid statute
defines the illegal unconscionable price in terms of percentage increases.
Under that law, prima facie evidence of unconscionability is charging "an
amount equal to or in excess of twenty-five percent of the average price..
73
*prior to the declared state of emergency."
Most of these laws allow sellers to charge higher prices in the
event that they experience higher costs due to the emergency or market
disruption. 74 However, statutory language differs in some potentially legally significant ways. Virginia's law allows price increases incurred "solely"
as a result of "additional costs."75 New York's law allows higher costs un66 New York law applies to all "essential consumer goods," meaning those used or bought
"primarily for personal, family or household purposes." § 396-r(2).
67 Virginia law applies to any "necessary goods and services," meaning any good
for which consumer demand does, or is likely to, increase as a
consequence of the disaster, and includes, but is not limited to, water,
ice, consumer food items or supplies, property or services for emergency
cleanup, emergency supplies, communication supplies and services,
medical supplies and services, home heating fuel, building materials and
services, tree removal supplies and services, freight, storage services,
housing, lodging, transportation, and motor fuels.
VA.CODE ANN. § 59.1-526 (Supp. 2005).
68 Florida's law applies to "any essential commodity including, but not limited to,
supplies, services, provisions, or equipment that is necessary for consumption or use as a direct
result of the emergency." FLA STAT. ANN. § 501.160(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2005).
69 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.18 (2005); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 5o1.16o(i)(b)(2); IND.
CODE ANN. § 4-6-9. 1-2; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-r(3)(b)(i), (ii); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145
(2005); VA. CODE ANN.

§

59.1-527.

70 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.16o(1)(b)(2); IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9.1-2; S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-5-145; VA.CODE ANN. § 59.1-527.
71 940 MASs. CODE REGS. 3.18.

N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-r(3)(a).
73 ALA. CODE § 8-31-4 (LexisNexis 2005).
74 940 MASs. CODE REGS. 3.18; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 5o1.16o(i)(b)(2) (West 2005).
75 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-527 (West 2005) (emphasis added). The use of the term "solely"
72
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der the condition that additional costs are "imposed on the defendant for
the goods or services" through circumstances "not within the control of the
defendant." 76 Increases attributable to cost factors, such as "replacement
costs, taxes, and transportation costs incurred by the retailer" are not sub77
ject to sanction.
The laws also vary in their geographic scope. Most laws do not
specify the area to which they apply. Some laws are more limited. Virginia
and South Carolina laws apply only "within the area for which the state of
emergency is declared." 71 The statutes also vary in terms of the duration of
application. Virginia law, for example, applies for thirty days following the
"time of disaster." 79
Violations of these statutes can lead to civil fines and penalties,' jail
time,8' restitution,', and revocation of relevant licenses.8 3 Some statutes explicitly disavow the creation of a private right of action.8 4
ii. Litigation.-New York's anti-gouging law has led to some of the few
reported opinions related to anti-gouging statutes. In People v. Two Wheel
Corp., the state sought an injunction to stop price gouging related to the
sale of electric generators during Hurricane Gloria.8 s The defendants were
charged with violating the anti-gouging laws between September 26 and
October 8, 1985, after the hurricane led to power outages on Long Island.
6
They had raised prices on generators by as much as sixty-seven percent.
The defendants appealed the lower court's injunction, first by arguing
that electric generators were not covered by the statute's definition of "essential consumer goods." The court rejected this argument on the ground

in the heightened cost clause reduces the likelihood of evidentiary debates about the sources
of price increases.
76 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 396-r(3) (McKinney 2005) (emphasis added).
77 IND. CODE ANN. § 4-6-9. 1-2 (West 2005).
78 VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-527; S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145 (2005).
79 "Time of disaster" is defined as the shorter of the period when a declaration is in
effect, or thirty days after a disaster. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-526.
80 See ALA. CODE § 8-31-5 (2005) (fines of up to $iooo per violation and a total of $z5,ooo
for any 24-hour period); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 5o1. 160(2) (West 20o5); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145
(2005).
81 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-145 (imprisonment up to 30 days for willful violations).
8z See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 50S. i6o(z)-(3) (West 2005) (stating a violation of § 5o 116o
is also a violation of § 501.204, which is punishable by restitution under § 501.2075).
83 See ALA. CODE § 8-31-5.
84 See ALA. CODE § 8-31-6; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 50i.60(7). The New York law does not
currently include a private right of action. See Americana Petroleum Corp. v. Northville Indus.
Corp., 606 N.Y.S.zd 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). Proposed legislation would create a private
right of action. Assemb. 66z, 228th Ann. Legis. Sess. (N.Y. zoo5).
85 People v. Two Wheel Corp., 512 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), aff'd, People
v. Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.2d 692 (N.Y. 1988).
86 Id. at 44o-4i.
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that the generators were marketed and bought for household use.8 7Second,
the defendants argued that they had raised triable issues of fact concerning whether the higher prices they were charging were due to "increased8
freight and labor expenses incurred by them during the power failure."
The court rejected this argument, finding that the defendants' evidence
on this point consisted solely of declarations that such costs had increased
rather than actual evidence that they had. 9 In a far more questionable
holding, the court found that labor and shipping costs were not "the type
of costs expressly taken into account by the language of the statute." 9° The
court did not explain its reasoning. Perhaps shipping and labor costs are not
considered costs "for the goods," although that assertion is questionable
given that labor and shipping costs are elements of the cost of a good or service. Nor is it fair to say that labor and shipping costs are not "imposed" on
a seller or are within a seller's control, because the seller can simply refuse
to pay higher prices and decline to purchase the shipping/labor services.
Such a construction would erase the added costs exception since any cost
the seller agrees to pay (including for raw material or product) is ultimately
"within" the seller's control. Third, the court rejected the defendants' assertion that the price increases were not unconscionable. 9'
Finally, the court rejected the defendants' argument that the statute
was unconstitutionally vague. 92 The mere fact that the statute did not contain a "fixed rate or percentage of permissible price increase" did not make
it unconstitutional. 93 Affirming the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division's holding, the New York Court of Appeals cautioned that not "all
price increases are prohibited during periods of abnormal market disruptions," 94 but ruled that in the instant case the attorney general had met his
burden of proving an unconscionable price increase.g5
In Peoplev. Chazy Hardware,Inc., the attorney general challenged a price
increase in electrical generators following a January, 1998 ice storm which
left thousands of homes and businesses without electrical power.96 The
defendant had sold generators purchased at $533-$656 for up to $1,190
during the immediate aftermath of the storm.97 Again, the court upheld
87 Id. at 440.

88 Id. at 440-41.
89 See People v. Two Wheel Corp., 512 N.Y.S.zd at 441.
90 Id.
91 See id.
92

See id.

93 Id.
94 People v. Two Wheel Corp., 525 N.E.zd 692, 700 (N.Y. 1988), aff'g People v. Two
Wheel Corp., 512 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
95 See id. at 699-700.
96 People v. Chazy Hardware, Inc., 675 N.Y.S.zd 770, 771 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1998).
97 Id. at 771-72.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94

the statute against a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness. 98 The court
further found that the price charged was unconscionable as a matter of
law because it amounted to price hikes of between fifty-nine percent and
ninety-three percent.-9
That same ice storm also produced perhaps the most curious case
on the New York price-gouging law, People v. Beach Boys Equipment Co. Beach Boys sold generators at $I,2OO, twice the price charged by other
retailers. 10 Yet the defendant had paid$i,ooo to purchase the generators
from its supplier.102 The court found that respondent failed to show that
the price was "imposed" upon it because it "did not explain why it paid
its supplier $i,ooo for a... generator that retails for $550, nor did it respond
to proof that the supplier purchased the generators for $480." 103 Although
the government apparently produced evidence that the purchase "was not
an arm's length transaction" 104 (although we are never told why), it would
seem obvious that the respondent paid a higher price because it knew it
could get a higher price due to increased demand for the generators. Although the appellate.court modified the lower court's restitution order, it
upheld a finding of a violation of the anti-gouging law.105
3. No-increaselaws. -The harshest type of anti-gouging law bars any price
increase beyond that required by the higher costs of post-disaster economic
activity. Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Connecticut have such laws.
Three of these laws played or are likely to.play a role in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. Georgia's governor invoked its law to declare a state of
emergency after Katrina prompted gas price levels to rise as high as $6.00
per gallon.' °6 Mississippi and Louisiana, of course, bore the brunt of Katrina's physical impact.
These no-increase laws differ in terms of the products to which they
apply and their necessary triggering events. Georgia law applies only to
essential consumer goods, barring selling "at retail any goods or services
necessary to preserve, protect, or sustain the life, health, or safety of persons or their property at a price higher than'the price at which such goods
were sold or offered for sale immediately prior to the declaration of a state
of emergency."107 Louisiana's law is broader:
98 See id.at 773-74.
99 Id. at 773.
ioo People v. Beach Boys Equip. Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d
io Id. at 730.
102

729

(N.Y. App. Div. 2ooo).

Id.

io3 Id. at 73o-31.
104 Id. at 731.
1o5 Id.
io6 Perdue Works to Stem PriceGouging (WXIA television broadcast Sept. 2, 2005).
107 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393.4(a) (995).
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During a state of emergency as declared by the governor or as declared
by the parish president, the value received for goods and services sold
within the designated emergency area may not exceed the prices ordinarily
charged for comparable goods and services in the same market area at, or
immediately before, the time of the state of emergency."'"
Perhaps fortuitously (time will tell), Louisiana law was amended on June
28, 2005, just two months before Katrina struck, to broaden the trigger to
include both declared states of emergency and "during a named tropical
storm or hurricane in or threatening the Gulf of Mexico."'- Mississippi also
bars pricing above "the prices ordinarily charged" for "allgoods and services
sold within the designated emergency area" following the declaration of a
state of emergency or local emergency."10 Legislation in 2005 broadened
the area in which the law applied from the "designated" area of emergency
to the entire state.'
Connecticut law allows the government to declare two types of emergencies that trigger price controls: an energy emergency or a supply emergency." 2 The law bars selling energy resources at a price "which exceeds
the price at which such energy resource was sold ... prior" to the Governor's
declaration of an "energy emergency."',3The governor can also designate
a particular product as being "in short supply or in danger of becoming in
short supply," which imposes the same cap on the prices of the designated product."14 Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana law allow for increases
caused by higher costs."s
Punishment under these laws includes fines, civil liability, and criminal
liability. Violations of the Georgia Act can lead to civil fines: $2,000 for a
willful violation, $5,000 with cause, and $io,ooo if the gouging is related to

io8 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732 (2005).
109 2oo5 La. Sess. Law Serv. 149 (West).

i1o Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-25 (2oo3) (pending legislation in 2oo6 MS H.B. 86 (NS))
(emphasis added).
III H.B. 1309, I2oth Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (enacted).
112 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-232 (1991).
113 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-232(b).

114 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-232(a).

115 Georgia law permits sellers to raise prices in response to an increase in the cost of
acquiring or transporting goods to the disaster area. GA. CODE ANN. § 1o-1-393.4(a) (1995).
Louisiana law allows sellers to "include reasonable expenses and a charge for any attendant business risk, in addition to the cost of the goods and services which necessarily are
incurred in procuring the goods and services during the state of emergency." LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29:732 (2005). Mississippi law allows increases for "any expenses, the cost of the goods
and services which are necessarily incurred in procuring such goods and services during a state
of emergency or local emergency." MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-25 (2003) (pending legislation in
2oo6 MS H.B. 86 (NS)) (emphasis added).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 94

the sale of supplies used for salvage, repair, or reconstruction." 6 Louisiana
law provides for civil remedies, including restitution." 7 Violations of the
Connecticut law are unfair trade practices and can lead to civil fines and
up to one year in prison. "S Mississippi's law imposes what are probably
the harshest punishments for price gouging. If the defendant's conduct is
"willful" and the price differential between post- and pre-disaster price is
more than $z5o, the violation is a felony punishable by a fine and not less
than one year and up to five years in prison."9 Violations amounting to a
smaller price differential are misdemeanors.20 Legislation in Mississippi
in 2005 lowered the price differential triggering felony punishment from
.

$250 to $50

II.

121

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PRICE CAPS AND ANTI-GOUGING
LAWS: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

Anti-gouging laws and other price mechanisms may be "well-meaning interventions.., designed to manipulate market allocations," but according
to the standard economic view they often "backfire because they cannot
account for the complex incentives in an intricate industry." 122 One of the
"fundamental prediction[s] of economics is that price controls reduce the
supply of the good or service whose price is controlled."' 23 Price controls
are thus "counterproductive," leading to "deadweight loss."124 Law and
economics does not distinguish between "naked" price controls (in which
a government agency sets the actual price at which producers can sell) and
the anti-gouging laws described in the previous section.125 Such laws limit
prices based on some aspect of their pre-disaster level; since the forces of
supply and demand would inevitably lead to inflationary pressure for most
"necessaries" following a disaster, anti-gouging laws will have the same
6
economic effect as a traditional price cap.12

116 GA. CODE ANN. §§ lo-1-397(a)(i)(B), Io-1-397(a)(2)(B) (1975), 1o-1-438 (I995).
117 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:732.

118 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-232(d) (i99i).
119 Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-24-25.
120 Id.
121

H.B. 1309, 12oth Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2005) (enacted).

Deck & Wilson, supranote 8, at 28.
Patricia M. Danzon & Scott E. Harrington, Workers' Compensation Rate Regulation:
How PriceControls IncreaseCosts, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1 (2001).
124 Id.
125 See Editorial, InPraise of'Gouging,'WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2005, at Ai6 (referring to antigouging statutes as "de facto price controls" and arguing that they are "wrongheaded").
126 A distinction could be made between price controls and anti-gouging laws in that
anti-gouging laws generally apply only in the short- and medium-term. Over that time horizon,
122

123
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Even after a hurricane, terrorist strike, or other disaster, the standard
law and economics thinking would be that price caps and anti-gouging laws
reduce economic efficiency by misallocating resources.'2 7 Caps and limits
on price increases induce shortages if they are operative at a price below
the market equilibrium. 2s John Lott, an American Enterprise Institute
fellow and frequent author in the area of law and economics, wrote after
Hurricane Katrina that "political threats of price controls and price-gouging
lawsuits" would, in the long run, mean that "consumers ... will suffer."'' 19
Price controls do not stop prices from rising, says Lott, they only "change[]
how [consumers] pa[y]." 130Time spent in lines at gas pumps, for example,
replaces money paid for gas after price controls take effect.' 3' The fact that
these costs are not reflected in the sticker price of a product does not render them illusory.132 These efforts to obtain products in the face of shortages amount to a waste of time and resources that could otherwise be used to
33
clean up the mess caused by a disaster and begin the rebuilding process.'
Additionally, price controls have the effect of producing an inefficient allocation of goods-instead of the parties who value the goods most (and are
willing to pay the highest prices) receiving the products and putting them
34
to that high-value end use, someone else ends up with goods.'
Moreover, anti-gouging laws or price caps may interfere with the natural corrective mechanisms of the market. High prices mean that inventories will build up as some consumers forego purchasing the affected prod-

supply may be inelastic. Price controls in the face of inelastic supply simply transfer wealth
from suppliers to consumers, but lead to no deadweight loss. Most commentators would argue
that supply of most products affected by anti-gouging laws will increase even in the short run,
since suppliers will make every effort to bring products into affected areas in pursuit of higher
profit margins and increased demand. See Lott & Jones, supra note 4.
127 See Martha Musgrove, Editorial, FreeMarket? It's Price-Gouging-AndIt Stinks!, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. I, 1992, at 39A.
128 Price controls or caps generally have no effect on prices, or efficiency, if they are set
at a level above what the market would produce free of restraint. An above-market price cap's
only potential effect is to facilitate coordinated price fixing by affected firms, who can now use
the price cap as a target price.
129 Lott & Jones, supra note 4, at A33.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 See Donald J. Boudreaux, On PriceGouging,ThE FREEMAN, April 2005, at 14.
133 Id.
134 See Moody, supra note 16 ("The higher price also served to ration a scarce good... to
those consumers who wanted it the most...."). Moreover, if prices are capped either directly
or indirectly through anti-gouging laws, consumers may face artificially low prices. Since their
demand (and willingness to pay) is high in the aftermath of a disaster, early arrivals in the
shop queue may purchase more of a product than they would otherwise be tempted to. Later
arrivals could be left without access to any product at all. See Karen Selick, There's Some Good in
Gouging,"IF GLOBE AND MAIL, Jan. 1998, availableat http://www.karenselick.com/GM98o124.
html.
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ucts; with time, those accumulated inventories will lead to lower prices.'35
Price controls retard the accumulation of inventories of highly demanded
products.
Economic analysis of "gouging" predicts that the market will punish
suppliers who overcharge, meaning that they charge more than the market
will bear, through the forces of competition. After a disaster, both supply
and demand may push prices higher.'3 6 Supply contracts as existing stocks
of products as well as substitutes are destroyed or contaminated.- 7 At the
same time, demand for "necessary" products like bottled water, food, and
medicine may rise as consumers either develop new or additional need for
the products,1' s or fear future shortages and desire to "hoard" against that
possibility.'39 Prices naturally rise-but a seller who charges above the new
adjusted market price will lose business to other rivals and be forced to
lower prices back towards the market equilibrium. Laws to combat gouging are, in this view, unnecessary, because the market will punish overcharging on its own.
Law and economics may also object to additional incentives plausibly
created by anti-gouging laws and their enforcement. For example, the uncertainty associated with triggering prices of various "unconscionability"style laws may lead some sellers to simply shut down operations during
emergency periods to avoid potential liability. 4 Anti-gouging laws' potential to lead sellers to forego transactions entirely-like rent control's potential to reduce new construction-is an economically inefficient outcome.
Price controls may also lead to black markets. As shortages develop in
the mainstream market, opportunities for black marketers emerge. Black
market sellers would demand even higher prices than the market (free of

135 Lott & Jones, supra note 4, at A33; see also In Praise of Price Gouging, http://www.
janegalt.net/blogarchives/oo5435.html (Sept. I, 2005) ("lHligh prices don't just make people
want to drive less; they make people what to supply more.... Prices of everything rise after a
disaster, and a good thing too, since that encourages people and material to flood into the damaged area, where they're needed most. When well-meaning politicians impost 'anti-gouging'
laws, they slow the flow of resources to repair the damage.")
136 See Boudreaux, supranote 131.
137 Gregory R. Kirsch, Note, Hurricanes and Windfalls. Takings and Price Controls in
Emergencies, 79 VA. L. REv. 1235, 1256 (1993) ("[Tlhe supply infrastructure was devastated:
there was no electricity or water, stores and warehouses were damaged, and roads were
blocked.").
138 Id. at 1256 ("Consumers will demand larger quantities of certain 'emergency goods'
....
including food, flashlights, batteries, ice ....
generators, plywood, roofing materials, bottled
water, hotel rooms and temporary apartments...").
139 See Boudreaux, supra note 132.
14o See Bell, supra note 14 (explaining that a seller wishes she had simply closed her
stations on September i i, which the attomeygeneral said would have prevented legal action
against her).
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restraint) in order to compensate for increased risk levels.' 4' Black markets
lead to untaxed transactions and increase the criminal element in post-disaster markets.

III. AN

ALTERNATIVE

ECONOMIC

FRAMEWORK

In spite of the dark picture painted of anti-gouging laws by traditional exponents of law and economics, this Article argues that there are hidden economic efficiency gains associated with such laws. Therefore, anti-gouging
laws need not be defended solely on fairness grounds, 142 but rather can be
justified using the same concepts and vocabulary used by law and economics advocates that attempt to bring them down.
This section explores two economic rationales for anti-gouging laws.
First, the Article explores the effects of natural and man-made disasters
on modern payment systems. Second, the Article explores the role of behavioral economics and pricing mechanism inefficiencies in post-disaster
consumer markets.
A. Massive Payment System Collapse
The beginning of the economic case for anti-gouging laws is the transformation of the American consumer economy in this era of electronic payment
processing.43 The last fifteen years have seen a revolution in the manner
in which consumers and businesses pay for goods and services. There is
far greater use of electronic payment methods than ever before.' 44 Check
usage is declining by double-digit percentages each year-from fifty billion checks written in 1995 to 37 billion in 2004. 45 At the same time, the
number of electronic payments (including debit cards, credit cards, and
automated clearinghouse systems) has increased from about thirty billion
transactions in 200 1 to forty-four billion transactions in 2003.146 As a society,
our dependence on these payment mechanisms has become clear.
These new electronic payment processing systems, however, are extremely vulnerable to short-term disruptions caused by disasters and terrorist strikes. Hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and large-scale terrorist

141 Kirsch, supranote 137, at 1259.
142 See lolls, Sunstein &Thaler, supranote 23, at 1513.
143 See Julia Alpert Gladstone, Exploring the Role of DigitalCurrency in the Retail Payments
System, 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 1193 (1997).

144 See Federal Reserve Banks Announce Changes to Increase Efficiency in Check Services,
Nov. 7, 2005, at 1O.

BANKING & FIN. SERV. POLICY REPORT,

145 Id.

146 Id.
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attacks have massive physical consequences. ,47Among these consequences
are water damage to computer and telecommunications infrastructure and
power outages.'48 Large-scale disasters and attacks, in the short run, may
have the effect of disabling vulnerable modern payment systems.' 49 Systems may be destroyed and individual records needed to access electronic
resources may be lost.150 "Old fashioned" payment mechanisms (cash and
checks) are also not immune. Rain and flooding destroy the ink and paper
on checks and may wash away cash and credit cards.' 5' Because of increasing dependence on electronic payment systems, consumers may no longer
keep on hand as many checks or as much cash as they did in the past,
magnifying the effects on liquidity of a disaster or terrorist attack. Stories
of consumers losing access to their economic assets during Hurricane Katrina's aftermath abound.' 52
Disasters and terrorist attacks could have potentially disabling effects
on modern payment mechanisms. In that context, anti-gouging laws may
make economic sense. The standard law and economics theory objected
to anti-gouging rules in large part because of their effects on allocative efficiency and their interference with the operation of market supply and
demand. However, the effects of a payment system collapse from a postdisaster market failure may prevent those forces from actually operating
as law and economics foretells. Consumers may place immense value on
a particular product, but with limited access to hard currency and to their
147 Copelan & Lamb, supra note 22, at 30 ("Andrew was the third most intense hurricane
to hit the United States in the twentieth century. Roofless houses, treeless neighborhoods,
downed street lights and signs, and massive damage to other building structures covered
much of southern Dade County.... [Tihere were as many as 250,000 people homeless, 85,000
people jobless, and an estimated 85,000 uninhabitable structures.").
148 See Thomas A. Birkland, Disasters andthe Courts'Agenda, 37 No. 4 JUDGES' J. 6,8 (1998)
("Even relatively small disasters can damage electrical and mechanical systems, rendering
buildings unusable.").
149 Albert B. Crenshaw, Rebuilding, Without Financial Records, WASH. PosT, Sept. 2, 2005,
at Di ("How do you get a credit card bill, let alone pay it, when your house is gone, your very
address is gone, your bank's offices are gone?"); see also Birkland, supra note 147, at 7 ("As
modem society becomes more dependent on electricity, phones, computers, and other convenience, natural disasters can cut us off from these conveniences that we take for granted,
severely disrupting our lives and making the disaster recovery process even more difficult.").
I5o See Crenshaw,supra note 149 ("As tens of thousands of families and businesses struggle to rebuild after Hurricane Katrina, many of them will find themselves not only without
homes, cars and other possessions but also without the paper and perhaps even electronic
records and resources fundamental to the working of American life and commerce.").
151 See, e.g., Economic Snapshot, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Sept. 7, 2005, at 6. ("Social
Security cards, driver's licenses, credit cards and other personal documents are literally floating
around New Orleans....").
152 See Kevin G. Hall, Callers Seek ATfs, Rescue; Bank Hotline Takes Calls Asking for Help
with Finances, Mail, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Sept. 5, 2005, at ioA ("One man asks why don't
[sic] ATM cards work. A woman lost her credit cards, checkbook and all forms of identification
in Hurricane Katrina.").
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electronic assets, consumers may simply be unable to purchase the products at an elevated price. Products won't go to those who value them most,
but rather to those whose money-under-the-mattress happens to have survived explosion, fire, or flood. While a true neoclassical economist might
expect alternative payment methods (such as ad hoc promissory notes and
guarantees) to develop for overcoming such limitations, that expectation is
probably unrealistic in the immediate confusion and clutter of a terrorist
attack or natural disaster.
Moreover, consumers may be operating under imperfect information
(or irrationality) in post-disaster settings. Consumers may not know exactly
what they will need to survive the aftermath of a disaster at the time they
confront a particular purchase. They may make poor initial decisions, which
their lack of access to electronic assets may make difficult to overcome.
When consumers are unable to access their economic resources because
of electronic payment system collapse, they may have to simply do without certain products. The effects of foregone consumption in a post-disaster environment are magnified by potential negative externalities. For
instance, consumers who forego toiletries and disinfectants may develop
bacterial infections or diseases that they spread to other survivors. Consumers who forego gasoline and the vehicular mobility it facilitates may
remain in crowded, unstable environments, leading to violent tinderboxes
or the need for dangerous and expensive government rescue efforts.
Anti-gouging laws may help mitigate these tragic results in the shortterm. By creating disincentives for prompt price inflation, anti-gouging
laws may give consumers time to make intelligent choices and to obtain
products with their limited hard currency assets before those currency reserves run out. With time, consumers will be able to access their electronic
resources. But in the short-term, consumers may have greater demand for
products with positive externalities than their limited resources permit
them to satisfy.
This analysis provides an economic case for anti-gouging laws. However, it also suggests proper limits for those laws. First, anti-gouging laws
should be limited to the areas of the actual physical effect of a disaster or
attack, or to areas where survivors of such attacks or disasters are likely to
flee. Laws with geographic limits-such as Virginia's'53 and South Carolina's'---are most likely to have the efficiency advantages described in this
section. On the other hand, proposals that apply to anti-gouging laws on
a statewide level (like the one enacted in Mississippi earlier this year),5s
even when the disaster only impacts a limited area in a physical sense, are
not economically wise. Similarly, applying anti-gouging laws in areas far

153 Seesupra Section I.C.2.
I54 See supra Section I.C.2.
155 See supra Section I.C.3.
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from disaster zones-like Georgia's invocation of its law after Hurricane
Katrina' s6 or Michigan's effort to punish gas price gougers after the September i i attacks' 57-- does not make economic sense. Once we recognize the
importance of payment mechanism breakdowns as a justification for antigouging laws, it becomes clear that disaster and relief policymakers with
the authority to establish boundaries for disaster zones should limit such
boundaries to the areas in which there are physical effects, or numerous refugees whose access to the tools of electronic payment methods may have
been compromised.'58 In concrete terms, the logic developed in this Article
speaks in favor of applying anti-gouging laws in Mississippi and Louisiana
after Hurricane Katrina, but against applying them anywhere except lower
Manhattan following the September i i attacks.
Second, anti-gouging laws should only apply in circumstances where
there is actual and widespread physical destruction. Where the destructive
effects of an attack are limited, or have only psychological consequences,
anti-gouging laws are not appropriate because there are not likely to be
breakdowns in electronic payment systems. While consumers may panic
and attempt to hoard goods, thereby leading to a price jump, the best policy
is to let the market check such irrational behavior. Only where an emergency leads to real destruction on a wide level should anti-gouging laws
apply. To the extent that current laws are triggered only by gubernatorial
decree, governors should only declare emergencies when and in those areas
where there has been physical destruction. Again, this logic suggests that
anti-gouging laws were not economically efficient when applied after the
September i i attacks outside of the immediately affected areas in lower
Manhattan. However, such laws likely will enhance efficiency to the extent
they are applied in mid-to-coastal Louisiana and Mississippi in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
Third, anti-gouging laws should (as most do) come with strict time limits. Electronic payment systems are quite vulnerable in the short-term, but
with time can be repaired. Consumers should be able to access their bank
account information-particularly from national banks-within a short
amount of time after removing themselves from a disaster area. Although
Katrina certainly demonstrated that response is not always prompt, govern-

156 See supra Section I.C. 3 .
157 See supra notes 15-17 & accompanying text.
158 Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that refugees will often flee far beyond the immediately affected area. Law professors and students from New Orleans schools surfaced here
in Toledo, as well as in Chicago and in a number of East Coast cities. In most cases, I suspect
that refugees who traveled such distances did so to be close to family members who lived
in such cities. Because such family members likely provided short-term financial support to
the extent that refugees were unable to access their own assets, those refugees are less of a
concern than those who remain in more proximate environments.
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ment programs can also step in to provide affected victims with enough
cash to be able to satisfy their immediate needs.
Fourth, such laws should not apply to all products (most do not), but
only to those products likely to be in high demand after the particular disaster. Moreover, enforcement agencies should target prosecution towards
sellers of products most likely to help alleviate negative externalities.
Medicine, communications equipment, and transportation services, more
so than even food, are likely to have such external effects.
B. BehavioralEconomics and ProductMarket Inefficiency
A second economic justification for anti-gouging laws begins with recognition of the limits of pricing market efficiency in the face of natural or
man-made disasters. The law and economics critique of anti-gouging laws
presumes that markets operate with minimum friction or inefficiency. Prices may rise in the short run after a supply shock or insecurity-generated
upswing in demand, but in time, as inventories build and supply expands,
prices will fall. Interfering with the natural forces of the market may prevent this self-correcting mechanism from functioning properly.
The problem with this argument is that markets are not always perfect.
In particular, to the extent that the pricing mechanism for a particular product suffers from asymmetric inefficiency, the law and economics story is not
wholly satisfying.
Prices, in the real world, are sticky. Behavioralists have argued persuasively that consumers and suppliers do not always behave as rational riskaverse self-interested utility maximizers. Instead, real-world decision making is often affected by psychological "heuristics," which are short-cuts that
individuals internalize to reduce the psychic costs of decision-making. 5 9
Two of these heuristics-availability and anchoring-are particularly important in post-disaster markets.'
The availability heuristic leads to seemingly irrational behavior because market actors overestimate the probability of an event if they have
witnessed that event.' 6, In post-disaster markets, the availability heuristic
may lead to higher price hikes than supply shocks and increased demand
would require. Suppliers in affected areas-having witnessed the destructive force of a natural disaster or terrorist attack and experienced first hand
the difficulty of conducting "business as usual"-may overestimate the
market impact of the relevant event. Fearing widespread supply outages
159 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 23, at 1477-78 (explaining heuristics that are
utility maximizing over the long run do not always produce seemingly rational results with
respect to individual decisions).
16o Id. at 1477-8o; see also James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of
PsychologicalFactorsin MefgerDecision-Making,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1372 (zoo1).
161 Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 23, at 1477.
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and future difficulties, suppliers may increase prices beyond the market
equilibrium.
The anchoring heuristic then comes into play. Anchoring describes the
process by which an individual attaches a particular value to an item be'
cause the value is "available" or "strongly present in the mind."1
62Even
after new information becomes available, the "anchored" mind is reluctant
to adjust its preferences accordingly. 63 In the post-disaster context, law and
economics predicts that suppliers who overprice will be punished by the
market and accumulate unsold inventories, such that they will quickly be
forced to lower prices. Instead, anchoring suggests that individual suppliers
may continue to charge inefficiently high prices even afterthey become aware
that they have overestimatedthe market impact ofthe disaster.
As a result of the interplay of these two individual decisionmaking heuristics, markets for some products may overreact quickly to the news of a
disaster. Markets may then be slower to correct than law and economics
predicts. Prices will remain above the optimal level, and consumers who
should be purchasing goods and services will not be. The impact of this
inefficiency is again exacerbated by the negative externalities associated
with forgoing consumption of products like medicine and fuel in a post-disaster environment. Sticky, supra-optimal pricing leads to wasted resources
and inefficiencies.
Anti-gouging laws may therefore be defended as preventing overreaction in the face of news of a disaster. Because legal limits exist on price
increases, producers may not raise prices to an irrationally high level. Even
if anti-gouging laws lead to below-market pricing in the immediate aftermath of a natural or man-made disaster, as supply expands and demand
retracts in the weeks after a disaster, that pricing level may be the more optimal level over a medium-run view than what a sticky market would have
yielded. In other words, it is plausible that anti-gouging laws represent a
trade-off between short-run inefficiencies and medium-run inefficiencies.
By emphasizing only the short-run inefficiencies of anti-gouging laws, a
standard law and economic analysis misses the total picture.
Empirical evidence has substantiated fact patterns consistent with this
analysis. Petroleum products react sharply to supply shocks (i.e., decreases
in supply), but then seem to respond at a lag to subsequent supply expansion. Numerous studies have documented that when oil prices rise, gasoline
prices quickly follow (oil being a "supply" element of gasoline and other
derivative petroleum products).164 Yet, when oil prices fall, gasoline prices
i6o, at 1372.
163 See Alex Geisinger, Nothing But FearItself: A Social-PsychologicalModel of Stigma Harm
and ts Legal Implications,76 NEB. L. REv. 452, 482 (1997).
164 Margherita Grasso & Matteo Manera, Asymmetric ErrorCorrection Models for the OilGasoline Price Relationship, FONDAZIONE ENi ENRICO MArEI, May 2005, http://www.feem.it/
Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/WP2oo5-o75.htm?WP-Page= i.
16z See Fanto, supra note
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fall far more slowly.165 The petroleum market's corrective mechanisms are
asymmetrical in their efficiency.
This analysis of pricing market inefficiency does not lead to precisely
the same conclusions about the proper scope and application of anti-gouging laws as the previous subsection's payment-methods-failure analysis.
Because pricing market inefficiency may extend beyond the actual borders of a disaster's physical impacts, anti-gouging laws may make economic
sense under a pricing analysis even where the physical impacts of a disaster
are not felt (but where news or word of mouth leads to an overestimation of
the market impacts of a disaster). Still, the closer one is to ground zero, the
more one is likely to over-weight the effects of a market impact. So while
a pricing mechanism analysis might lead to justifications for broader application of anti-gouging laws, it also suggests that anti-gouging laws should
be more vigorously enforced the closer one gets to the area of physical
impact.
The pricing market theory also lends itself to greater empirical substantiation than the payment mechanisms analysis. Since the responsiveness
of prices to natural disasters and their resulting stickiness in the face of
"good news" is observable and can be empirically analyzed using event
study analysis and time series, policymakers should be able to determine
what types of products are particularly characterized by the dual impact of
"availability" and "anchoring" as described in this section. It is with respect
to those products, then, that anti-gouging laws may make the most sense.

IV. CONCLUSION

Three legal regimes exist to limit "price gouging" after natural and manmade disasters: (I) Antitrust law bars collaborative price increases; (2) Antigouging laws specifically target the difficult-to-define practice of gouging;
and (3) General contract and consumer law may provide more common law
remedies for aggrieved consumers. Neither antitrust law nor general contract law seems to play a major post-disaster role. Antitrust law generally
only applies where there are cooperative arrangements to increase prices
on the part of competitors. The law clearly bars such conduct and provides
severe penalties. Therefore, collective action by competitors seems rare.
Practical legal impediments to the use of contract and consumer law make
them rather irrelevant as sources of post-disaster price relief. Therefore,
this Article turned its attention to anti-gouging laws.
This Article argued that post-disaster anti-gouging laws may not be as
bad as law and economics theory supposes. Such laws take many forms.
Some bar any increase at all in the price of selected products after a disas-

165 Id.
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ter; others impose (arbitrary) percentage caps on price increases; and other
laws make unlawful "unconscionable" price increases.
A traditional law and economics analysis views such laws with the same
disdain as naked price controls. Anti-gouging laws arguably lead to deadweight loss, misallocation of resources, shortages, and do not bring down
prices in the long term.
Yet, this Article highlights potential efficiency gains associated with
carefully crafted anti-gouging laws. This is not to say that there are no legal
or policy objections to such laws.,' However, where disasters trigger payment system collapses and where consumption externalities are present, or
where pricing mechanisms fail due to availability and anchoring, anti-gouging laws may help increase economic efficiency. Several states, however,
have laws which are greater in scope than necessary to achieve these advantages, by including areas not physically affected by natural disasters and
terrorist strikes among the areas subject to anti-gouging regulations. Such
laws must either be reformed or justified on non-efficiency grounds.

166 For a discussion of the Takings Clause implications of post-disaster price controls,
see Kirsch, supranote 136, at 1261.

